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and injury to the occupants of the car, particularly when an SUV strikes a car broad-
side. Moreover, the design features of SUVs that create these dangers provide no
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SUV-a marginal benefit that pales in comparison to the risks created. This Note
suggests two possibilities for addressing the extraordinary dangers of SUVs. The first
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discrimination coupled with a fundamental right merits strict scrutiny. While ex-felon
disenfranchisement may be constitutional, once a state provides a procedure by
which ex-felons may regain the right to vote, that procedure must not restrict access
to the fundamental right to vote on the basis of wealth. This Note explores the back-
ground of felon voting laws, analogous challenges to poll taxes and literacy tests, and
wealth discrimination jurisprudence. After an analysis of past and current challenges
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laws and finds them unconstitutional.
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The Federal Trademark Dilution Act ("FTDA") has failed to protect, in the
manner intended by Congress, the subset of trademarks that have achieved a high
threshold of fame from subsequent uses that dilute or tarnish those trademarks.
Courts have applied inconsistent measures of fame to the trademarks of the litigants
before them and a poor wording choice in the drafting of the FTDA has led the
Supreme Court to conclude that famous trademarks must sustain actual harm to
their distinctiveness before their owners can receive the equitable remedy provided
under the Act. Based on the legislative history of the Act, both of these situations are
contrary to Congress's intent, and they reduce the effectiveness of the FTDA. This
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register, which will lead to more consistent determinations of the fame of a trade-
mark, and will clearly permit an equitable remedy before famous trademarks lose
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requirement in the United States Constitution has received much publicity. This note
examines the history and background of the requirement that our President be born
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compel Americans to pass a constitutional amendment to repeal the natural born
citizen requirement and discusses the reasons why many Americans oppose such a
constitutional amendment. The note then explores some of the current misconcep-
tions about globalization and concludes that Americans' fears and misconceptions of
globalization may very well prevent the success of a constitutional amendment.
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